EDID attacks

Modern display interfaces, such as HDMI, DVI, or DisplayPort, currently represent an underestimated attack surface, particularly through data manipulation EDID (Extended Display Identification Data).

Research conducted by security teams has shown that malformed or deliberately altered EDIDs can exploit vulnerabilities in graphics drivers, cause abnormal behaviors, or trigger memory overflows.

Moreover, the auxiliary channels integrated into these interfaces — such as I²C (DDC/CI) or CEC — can be abused to interact directly with a system or remotely manipulate certain display parameters.

This reality now positions screens and their connections as potential intrusion vectors, justifying increased attention in any physical or hardware security strategy.

HID attacks

The HID attacks exploit the implicit trust that systems place in standard input devices such as keyboards and mice.

By masquerading as a legitimate HID device, a malicious USB device can automatically execute a sequence of keystrokes or commands as soon as it is connected, thereby bypassing security policies applicable to traditional storage devices.

These attacks, made famous by devices such as theUSB Rubber Ducky, allowing for the rapid injection of malicious payloads, opening remote sessions, or compromising a system without user interaction, thanks to keyboard emulation recognized by default by operating systems.

Their effectiveness relies on execution speed, the ability to bypass traditional protections, and the difficulty for both the user and security solutions to distinguish a tampered HID device from an authentic device.

This is thus a particularly dangerous intrusion vector, capable of bypassing antivirus, USB filtering, or other control mechanisms, as highlighted by studies describing their operation and operational impact.